What are the prices of random variables? In this paper, we define the least-squares prices of coin-flipping games, which are proved to be minimal, positive linear, and arbitrage-free. These prices depend both on a set of games that are available for investing simultaneously and on a risk-free interest rate. In addition, we show a case in which the mean-variance portfolio theory is inappropriate in our incomplete market.
Introduction
Consider the following two coin-flipping games: Game A : Profit is 19 or 1 if a tossed coin yields heads or tails, respectively. Game B : Profit is 10 if a tossed coin yields heads or tails.
In general, game B is preferable to game A (see [7, Example 9.2] ). Despite the fact that the expectations concerning the two games are equal, the price of B should be higher than that of A. However, if game C is available for investing simultaneously, the three prices of these games should be the same; this is because the mixed game (A + C)/2 is equal to B. Game C : Profit is 1 or 19 if a tossed coin yields heads or tails, respectively. Therefore, the price of a game should change in accordance with the set of games that are available for investing simultaneously. As F. Black and M. Scholes demonstrate, the price of an option depends on the risk-free continuously compound interest rate r > 0 (see [1, page 643] ). It is noteworthy that if r = 0, no investor will invest his/her money, because no gain is expected. In this paper (except in Remarks 3.5 and 3.6), we assume that r is 0.05. The term "arbitrage-free" implies that no investor has an opportunity to earn a profit exceeding the risk-free interest rate.
Here, we introduce the pricing method of a coin-flipping game.
Theorem 1.1. Suppose that a game A := (a, b) involves a profit a or b (a, b > 0) if a tossed coin yields heads or tails, respectively. Put
, then the price of game A is given by u A r = √ ab/e r , and the optimal proportion of investment is 1. Otherwise, u
, where κ := (1 − 1 − 1/e 2r )/2, and the optimal proportion of investment is u
Proof . Using Remark 3.1 under the conditions of this theorem and solving the simultaneous quadratic equations, we obtain the conclusion. 7.224 and the optimal proportion of investment t u A r 0.274. Now, we explain the term "optimal proportion of investment." Let t ∈ [0, 1] be a proportion of investment; then, the investor repeatedly invests t of his/her current capital. For example, let c be the current capital; when the investor plays game A = (19, 1) once, his/her capital will be 19ct/u+c(1−t) or ct/u+c(1−t) if a tossed coin 1.051, we obtain the price u B r 9.512. In this case, the optimal proportion of investment is 1. This implies that the investor should invest his/her entire current capital in each attempt.
In Section 2, we will introduce the least-squares price u 
< E
A /e r for each A ∈ Ω.
For a better understanding of the background, we present our incomplete market assumptions as follows (compare with [8, Sections 2.1 and 8.2]).
1. Frictionless Market: There are no transactions costs or taxes, and all securities are perfectly divisible.
2. Price-Taker: The investor's actions cannot affect the probability distribution of returns on the securities. Every security has a positive expectation.
3. No Arbitrage Opportunities: There exits a unique riskless standard asset, that is not necessarily tradable. Further, there exists a security, wherein the limit expectation of the growth rate is equal to that of the riskless standard asset. The limit expectation of the growth rate of any security never exceeds that of the standard asset. The standard asset is usually provided by the riskless rate of interest.
4. No Short Sales: Combined with suitable transactions, all necessary short sales must be included in the securities (probability distribution of returns), that have positive expectations. For example, −(19, 1) + 2(16, 4) = (13, 7). 
Least-Squares Prices
Since the set T := {(t i ) ∈ S : L((t i )) ≤ 1} is not null, convex, closed, and thus compact, there is a unique point (x i ) ∈ T such that v := min (ti)∈T
Ai r ) and call it the least-squares price of A i in Ω for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For each mixed game
Ai /e r and u
Proof. By the above assumption, we obtain L((0)) = 1 and v = 0, which implies the conclusion. Theorem 2.4. The system of least-squares prices is arbitrage-free, and there is a mixed game that earns profit equal to the growth rate of e r .
Proof. As T ⊂ S and Q are compact, and u P n i=1 piAi r is continuous with respect to (p i ) ∈ Q (see Theorem 1.1), (x i ) ∈ T and (q i ) ∈ Q exist such that
This shows that the mixed game n i=1 q i A i earns profit that is equal to the growth rate of e r . On the other hand, for each nonzero mixed game
. Therefore, the game n i=1 k i A i earns profit that is equal to or less than the growth rate of e r .
Theorem 2.5. The system of least-squares prices is minimal in order to be arbitrage-free. Proof. We prove this by using reduction to absurdity. Assuming that a set of prices
Aj r for some j, then the game A j earns profit exceeding the growth rate of e r . Thus, we can assume that u
and thus
, that is, the mixed game n i=1 q i A i earns profit exceeding the growth rate of e r .
It is not difficult to verify that if Ω = {A i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and Ω ′ = {B j :
1 ≤ i ≤ s} are the bases of the convex cone Ψ, then n = s, A i = v i B i , and u 
Remarks
Remark 3.1. Consider a random variable X with nonnegative bounded profit a(x) and distribution dF (x). In the case where exp( log a(x)dF (x))/e r ≤ 1/ 1/a(x)dF (x), the price is given by u X r = exp( log a(x)dF (x))/e r , and the optimal proportion of investment is 1. Otherwise, the price u = u X r and the optimal proportion of investment t are determined by the simultaneous equations exp( log(a(x)t/u−t+1) dF (x)) = e r and (a(x) − u)/(a(x)t −ut + u)dF (x) = 0 (see [3, Corollaries 5.1, 5.3, and Section 6]).
Remark 3.2. Remark 3.1 can be generalized to the nonnegative unbounded case where a(x)>1 a(x) ν dF < ∞ for some ν > 0. For example, because
Petersburg game {profit 2 j with probability 1/2 j , j = 1, 2, ...} is priced at 4.816 with the optimal proportion of investment 0.204. Remark 3.3. In Section 2, the value of n is 1 or 2. However, when the reader challenges to study dice games, the value of n may be 36. To generalize this theory to the convex cone Ψ with a finite basis Ω, we need the fact that u Moreover, Remark 3.1 gives us the optimal proportion t = 0.4222 for the risky fund. Thus, the best proportions of investment to X, to Y , and the risk-free asset are tw = 0.1484, t(1 − w) = 0.2738, and 1 − t = 0.5778, respectively. The mean-variance portfolio theory cannot provide a proportion of 0.5778 for the risk-free asset (see [7, section 7 .1]). The geometric price of Y := {Y t } 0≤t<∞ is defined by sup 0<T <∞ u {Yt} 0≤t≤T .
